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ABSTRACT
With the passing of Robert M. Pirsig, I felt that it was an 
appropriate time to write a tribute to his work and the 
inluence it has had on my own theorising in regard to autistic 
ways of being. This relection utilises the concept of an ‘aut-
ethnography’ to examine passages that I had highlighted 
word by word when I irst read Pirsig’s book: Zen and the Art 
of Motorcycle Maintenance. These fragments contain links to 
a number of theoretical ‘lines of light’ within my own work 
and that of others, from his concepts of dynamic ‘quality’ to 
his discussion on the tension between scientiic method and 
lived experience.
Introduction
Luckily, one might say, I grew up in a family that loved books. Although I was of 
the persuasion of reading the Atlas, or Observer books, there was one book on my 
mother’s shelf that stood out above all the others with a strange and enticing title. 
That book was the best-selling philosophical novel Zen and the Art of Motorcycle 
Maintenance (Pirsig 1974). It was not until I was a young adult that I actually read 
it, yet it was to have an impact upon me that perhaps few other books have, and 
so this article is a tribute to that inluence.
When I irst opened Zen and read the introductory phrase I was intrigued by the 
riddle of what it meant and what would lay ahead for me in reading it:
What is good, Phaedrus, and what is not good – Need we ask anyone to tell us these 
things? (Pirsig 1974, 9)
At the irst time of reading, I was not sure if there was anything of meaning, let alone 
‘good’. In what sense did he mean ‘good’ anyway? Need we ask others? Perhaps, 
if one is not conident in one’s own views? Can we trust such views though? Also, 
who was this mysterious Phaedrus character? Within the irst few pages, however, 
© 2017 informa UK limited, trading as taylor & Francis Group
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 29 april 2017 
accepted 28 July 2017
KEYWORDS
autism; dynamic quality; 
low; monotropism
CONTACT Damian e. M. Milton   damianmilton.sociology@yahoo.com
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I had started to underline passages in the text, each word underlined separately 
to show their signiicance.
Aut-ethnography
Unlike auto-ethnography which often seeks to construct a coherent narrative of 
self over time, to me an aut-ethnography (at least my experience/version) is a frag-
mented one, where snippets of information are formed into ‘rhizomatic’ patterns of 
shifting meanings. This article seeks to simply relect on the passages I underlined 
some 25 years previously in my reading of Pirsig’s irst book (Pirsig 1974). I wanted 
to trace the passages I had originally highlighted and decipher patterns in the 
fragments that resonated with my work since that time.
Ghost in the machine
As a child I had experienced signiicant psychological trauma following a road-traf-
ic accident and resultant symptoms that one might consider today as post-trau-
matic stress disorder. Having had some negative experiences with psychiatrists, I 
tended to avoid them. For a number of reasons I had also withdrawn from univer-
sity. For years I had felt a ‘presence’ in my life that I found di cult to explain. Was it 
a ‘displaced super-ego’? Was it just a symbolic manifestation of hidden inluences 
upon my being as it was then, and is now? I called this alter-ego ‘the conductor’ 
and wrote poems about my relationship with this igure. It was quite a revelation 
to ind interesting parallels with these experiences in Pirsig’s work and the use 
of his Phaedrus, along with his accounts of trauma at the hands of psychiatric 
professionals. Making such a connection made me feel less isolated, less alone.
Your common sense is nothing more than the voices of thousands and thousands of 
these ghosts from the past. Ghosts and more ghosts. Ghosts trying to make their place 
among the living. (Pirsig 1974, 43)
This passage resonated with me then and now. Perhaps the ‘conductor’ was not 
a ‘ghost’ as such, but symbolic of my own cultural conditioning, the idiosyncratic 
vessel that absorbed and produced discourse and praxis within a habitus, the 
conditioning of my own sociality and disposition, my very own Phaedrus.
He felt that institutions such as schools, churches, governments, and political organisa-
tions of every sort all tended to direct thought for ends other than truth, for the perpet-
uation of their own functions, and for the control of individuals in the service of these 
functions. He came to see his earlier failure as a lucky break, an accidental escape from a 
trap that had been set for him, and he was very trap-wary of institutional truths for the 
remainder of his time. (Pirsig 1974, 124)
Whilst giving me solace from the traumatising experiences of school life and 
political alienation, this passage also gave my guilt some release of pressure for 
having withdrawn from university. Paradoxically, it was the tales of university life 
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When I returned to academia, I did so embodying the spirit of Phaedrus that I had 
read about. I was to be a natural philosopher, to playfully destabilise the taken-for-
granted assumptions of anyone when I came across them. Perhaps it was I who 
was the ‘ghost in the system’ of sorts? At that time I had not come across ‘cripping’ 
or ‘queering’, let alone the concept of the ‘neuroqueer’ (Walker 2015), yet these 
ideas were certainly not alien to me when I did.
The scientiic method and lived experience
What you’ve got here, really is two realities, one of immediate artistic appearance and 
one underlying scientiic explanation, and they don’t match and they don’t it and they 
don’t really have much of anything to do with one another. That’s quite a situation. You 
might say there’s a little problem here. (Pirsig 1974, 63; original emphasis)
Reminiscent of the work of C.P. Snow or the ‘science wars’ of the 1990s, Pirsig high-
lighted the ‘two realities’ of art and science. Also in this passage is the notion of 
two sides of his metaphysics of ‘quality’ which he was to frame later in Lila (Pirsig 
1991) as ‘dynamic’ and ‘static’: the perception of immediate tacitly lived experience, 
and the formation of explicit and solidiied codiications of experience. However:
 When analytic thought, the knife, is applied to experience, something is always killed in 
the process. (Pirsig 1974, 86)
Similarly to Deligny (2015; Milton 2016) in his work with young autistic people, 
this form of analytic dissection is seen as a form of violence to the person and 
their experiences. Something is always lost in the process, whilst other things 
can become strangely reiied through where our attention happens to be driven 
towards:
From all this awareness we must select, and what we select and call consciousness is 
never the same as the awareness because the process of selection mutates it. We take a 
handful of sand from the endless landscape of awareness around us and call that hand-
ful of sand the world. (Pirsig 1974, 85)
Monotropism, dispositional diversity and the double empathy problem
Some things you miss because they’re so tiny you overlook them. But some things you 
don’t see because they’re so huge. We were both looking at the same thing, seeing the 
same thing, talking about the same thing, thinking about the same thing, except he 
was looking, seeing, talking and thinking, from a completely diferent dimension. (Pirsig 
1974, 62; original emphasis)
In this passage, Pirsig (1974) highlights how diferences in dispositional percep-
tions can be markedly diferent, even if ostensibly ‘looking at the same thing’, an 
idea that was no doubt inluential on ideas that I would develop into the theory 
of the ‘double empathy problem’ (Milton 2012). It is perhaps of particular interest 
that he should frame this within a context of a perception missing out on details, 
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cited in relation to diferences in perception between autistic and non-autistic 
people. A number of autistic scholars (Chown 2016; Lawson 2010; Murray, Lesser, 
and Lawson 2005) following the work of Murray (1992) have utilised notions of 
‘monotropism’ or an ‘interest’ model of autism, suggesting that interest, attention 
and motivation can become diferently channelled in autistic development. Pirsig 
(1974) uses the term ‘gumption’ in order to talk about such interest/motivation. A 
kind of fuel for engagement with the dynamic quality of immediate lived experi-
ence. Yet he also talked about ‘gumption traps’, where such interest can become 
blocked, sidetracked or entangled. He splits these into those which one may have 
little conscious control over (set-backs) and those one may have more input into 
(hang-ups), further broken down into: ego, anxiety and boredom.
Quality and low
But some things are better than others, that is, they have more quality, but when you 
try and say what the quality is, apart from the things that have it, it all goes poof! There’s 
nothing to talk about. (Pirsig 1974, 187; original emphasis)
The metaphysical concept of ‘quality’ that Pirsig utilises in Zen (Pirsig 1974) was 
further distinguished in Lila (Pirsig 1991) between ‘dynamic’ and ‘static’ quality. 
Far from being a binary analogy, Pirsig (1991) meant these terms as aspects of 
a dialectical monism. This quote from Zen indicates a description more akin to 
‘dynamic quality’ as outlined in Lila. This aspect of ‘quality’ refers to perceptual 
sensory experience that precedes the intellectual construction and interpretation 
of experience. A similar concept was deployed in the work of Deligny (2015) in 
relation to autistic people. When the ‘quality’ of phenomena becomes more ‘static’, 
it means it becomes explicit and deinable. One can question whether such ‘quality’ 
is truly ‘static’, yet such ideas are relatable to notions of tacit and explicit knowledge 
(see Milton 2014) and also the concept of low (McDonnell and Milton 2014).
In previous work (McDonnell and Milton 2014) I have argued that the repetitive 
behaviours often referred to in relation to autistic people could be interpreted as 
‘low’-like states, where someone is fully immersed in the ‘dynamic quality’ of an 
activity. Flow in this sense can be linked to the notion of ‘gumption’ (or interest). 
Interestingly, however, Pirsig relates notions of ‘quality’ and absorption in an activ-
ity with ‘care’:
When you want to hurry something, that means you no longer care about it and want to 
get on with other things. (Pirsig 1974, 36)
Where there is a lack of low, a blockage in ‘gumption’, a lack of interest in an activ-
ity one is supposed to be engaging in, then one could also say that one does not 
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When one isn’t dominated by feelings of separateness from what he’s working on, then 
one can be said to ‘care’ about what he’s doing. That is what caring really is, a feeling of 
identiication with what one’s doing. (Pirsig 1974, 300)
Could low-like states of dynamic quality be said to ward against alienation and 
anomie, increase a sense of well-being and reduce negative experiences of stress? 
I have also previously theorised that autistic people may not be as dependent on 
previously learned mental schema and potentially more reliant on directly per-
ceived phenomena ‘in-the-moment’ (Milton 2013). In this sense, autistic people 
could be said to be more in tune with the ‘dynamic quality’ that Pirsig speaks of, 
although perhaps less attuned to the more ‘static’ forms of ‘quality’ referred to?
 What we think of as reality is a continuous synthesis of elements from a ixed hierarchy 
of a priori concepts and the ever changing data of the senses. (Pirsig 1974, 136)
What if the synthesis of elements for autistic people operates in idiosyncratic ways, 
as suggested by many autistic authors (Chown 2016; Lawson 2010; Murray 1992; 
Murray, Lesser, and Lawson 2005)? Would that not lead to challenges in building 
mutual understandings within social interaction (Milton 2012, 2014)?
Final remarks
In just two philosophical novels, Pirsig ofers a myriad of insights that this article 
has merely scratched the surface of, and so I would encourage readers to dust 
down those old copies and read them anew.
Disclosure statement
No potential conlict of interest was reported by the author.
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